Decentralized Radian Improvement
Proposals (DRIPs)

Changes to the Radian Protocol can be initiated by anyone by creating a Decentralized Radian Improvement Proposal (DRIP). Once created, Radian holders can vote on the proposal during a staged voting event by cryptographically proving their Radian holdings to participate in the voting process. If passed, and enough Radian holders participate in voting, the change will be accepted and if necessary, implemented by the open source community of Radian core-dev developers.

Fair-Stake-Weighted Voting

By default, all assets and standard tokens on the Ethereum blockchain are at the beginning, second-class citizens when used within the Radian Protocol. In other words, any token can be used to create liquidity pools, and traded or swapped, but only first-class assets can be accepted into the Radian collector or used directly as collateral. On a specified interval (e.g. every quarter), assets that have a certain level of combined liquidity and stability can be voted on and elected for consideration to become first-class-citizens to be accepted into the Radian collector.

A time-limited election period will open, and users can vote on which assets will be made first-class — multiple qualifying assets will all be voted on at the same time, and multiple assets can be accepted as part of the voting process. Rather than users only voting on one asset, which creates potentials for majority bias, fraud, and exploitation in the voting process or even worse, unfairly chosen winners, the voters can prioritize assets they want and winners will be selected using a selection threshold within a modified Condorcet method. This allows the outcome to most accurately reflect the votes of the users and allows for multiple “best” candidates to win.

Condorcet voting and the condorcet voting paradox

Condorcet voting is one of the unique aspects of the Radian governance protocol. Condorcet voting is used for the selection and addition of new first-class tokens that will be accepted by the Radian collector and that can be used as collateral within the Radian ecosystem. The Condorcet method can be seen as more fair and superior to some other forms of voting, as the Condorcet method chooses the winner that wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates — thus, it results in a candidate preferred by more voters than others, whenever there is such a candidate.

The Condorcet paradox in social choice theory is a situation where collective preferences are paradoxical, because the majority wishes can be in conflict with the results. When this occurs, it is because the conflicting majorities are each made up of different groups of individuals. We believe that our governance voting approach solves these problems, while allowing multiple candidates to win during a single election.